The Grand Coronation of Death – A Civil War Tragedy: The Battle of Franklin and a Failed Commander
General Hood at Spring Hill and Franklin – The Peter Principle Embodied
Whereby the Disposition of Artillery and of Forrest’s Cavalry Illustrates Essential Flaws in the Commanding general’s abilities
by Daniel Mallock
“It is the blackest page in the history of the war of the Lost Cause. It was the bloodiest battle of modern times in any war. It was the finishing stroke to the independence of the Southern Confederacy. I was there. I saw it. My flesh trembles, and creeps, and crawls when I think of it today. My heart almost ceases to beat at the horrid recollection. Would to G-d that I had never witnessed such a scene! I cannot describe it. It beggars description. I will not attempt to describe it. I could not. The death-angel was there to gather its last harvest. It was the grand coronation of death.”
-Sam Watkins, Company Aytch

Following rapidly on the heals of the retreating Union Army from Spring Hill, TN in the early morning hours of November 30, 1864, Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry engaged Union Maj. General Schofield’s rear guard at the top of Winstead Hill, two miles from the outskirts of Franklin. One of the greatest and savage battles of the entire Civil War would soon be fought, a stunning disaster to the Confederacy and a shocking horror to every soldier involved in it.
As Schofield’s men withdrew to their already prepared line of earthworks at the southern end of the little town of Franklin (population 2000), Forrest surveyed the Union lines. These were strong earthworks built the previous year currently being improved by union infantry as he watched. They were formidable, fully manned with infantry and artillery. Forrest knew of these entrenchments having fought in the area many times.
The way to Nashville was now effectively blocked by Schofield’s army of 25,000 busily improving the earthworks at Franklin, and digging in. But Hood’s goal was not now Franklin, nor Nashville, but Schofield’s army itself.
Angry and frustrated at the previous day’s confusion at Spring Hill where Schofield’s army escaped what Hood had thought would be his greatest triumph a solid trap (everyone thought, with a few exceptions) that should have had the Union army surrounded and destroyed. But through some still not fully agreed upon miscommunication and confusion among the commanding general and his top officers the Union army was allowed to march by the Confederate camps in the dark of night and make their escape. Many Confederates at their fires wondered why no order to attack the Union troops was given- they could hear them marching by just as the blue soldiers could see the gray camp fires and even hear their conversations. This “affair” at Spring Hill was a great victory for Schofield to have escaped Hood’s trap, and a disaster for Hood most importantly for what was soon to follow. Spring Hill would become known to historians as the greatest error and lost opportunity of the entire war.
Early the next morning as daylight broke the chill cold of late November in middle Tennessee, the entire Army of Tennessee knew that a terrible mistake had been made and a great opportunity lost. They marched quickly north, chasing Schofield hoping to right the awful wrong of Spring Hill – the prey so nicely trapped had flown.
Hood was apoplectic, screaming recriminations at Cheatham, Forrest, and Cleburne rather than accepting responsibility for the miscommunications as Hood’s former commander Robert E. Lee would most assuredly have done in similar circumstances. Great leaders do not spread blame in a crisis – they accept the truth of the error, take responsibility for those they command, and immediately work to ensure that no such mistake should ever occur in future. Hood did none of these things. Recent studies of Army of Tennessee management under Hood show that disorganization, bad planning, and poor or non-existent staff work were at the core of the army’s tribulations. These deep structural flaws would lead to a missed opportunity at Spring Hill, and horrible disasters to follow the next day in Franklin.
Lacking the character and top level leadership traits necessary for a great commander the hero of Chickamauga, Gettysburg, Antietam, and so many other fields had been elevated to command of the Army of Tennessee over others better qualified for the post in temperament, skill, and character (particularly Patrick Cleburne). Nobody could ever impugn Hood’s bravery or courage or skill as a fighter in a subordinate role. His fame prior to the fall of Atlanta was well-earned.
Finally finished with Joe Johnston whom he saw as overly enamored with retreat, Jefferson Davis wanted a fighting general, an aggressive general, and he got what he wanted in Hood. But the price was too high, and only seen after the damage had been done. Hood himself would soon show his terrible flaws of character so illustrative of the “Peter Principle” with disastrous results for himself, the army, and the war effort itself. [Note: "The Peter Principle" states that in a "hierarchically structured administration, people tend to be promoted up to their 'level of incompetence'."]

“The old ‘Army of Tennessee’, which had been so formidable, ceased to be a formidable army on November 30.”
General John Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army
John Schofield, commander of the combined Army of Ohio (Jacob Cox commanding) and the Army of the Cumberland (David Stanley commanding) did not believe that Hood would make a frontal assault at Franklin. Schofield’s orders were to go to Nashville (18 miles to the north) to unite with the Union garrison under Thomas already there, and prepare for Hood. Had the Harpeth River not been swollen from recent rains and one of the bridge crossings at Franklin destroyed Schofield would have had no reason to stop in that quaint little town.
Hood’s well-earned aggressive reputation cautioned Schofield that the possibility of a frontal assault against his lines south of Franklin was not to be discounted, though he did not believe it likely. (The two commanders had known each other at West Point before the war.) More likely he thought that Hood would use Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry to cross the river and try to flank him out of Franklin by getting behind him and cutting off his retreat route to Nashville thus forcing a very different kind of battle than the one that was soon to begin.
With his forces in Franklin well protected by the solid entrenchments of the Carter House line, Schofield retired to Fort Grainger, an earthen fort high on Figuer’s Bluff overlooking the town across the Harpeth River. This fort was fully manned with artillery and commanded a field of fire that was only limited by the considerable range of the fort’s guns. Any army approaching Franklin or observed flanking its defenders by crossing the river on the eastern bank would be under its fire. Schofield was confident, but nervous. He knew that the previous day’s escape from Spring Hill had been a very close call. And he knew that Hood would, if he could, make him pay.
The armies were almost equal in size, each having about 24-27,000 combined infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Any direct assault on the Carter House line would be costly. Forrest, the great cavalry leader (acknowledged by Robert E. Lee shortly after Appomattox as the greatest commander of the war) knew that a frontal assault would be folly. He recommended a flank assault and promised Hood that if given two divisions in addition to his cavalry he would flank the Union army out of Franklin. Hood’s reply was negative. Looking down into the valley of Franklin from Winstead Hill he said, “We will make the fight”.
Standing at the top of Winstead Hill with his incredulous and disbelieving senior commanders Hood dismissed Cleburne and Cheatham and Forrest’s reservations and alternatives and gave the order for the army to form up and launch an attack directly down the hill, across two miles of open ground without cover, without artillery support (the main body of Confederate artillery was still on the road from Spring Hill and had not yet come up) and break the Union line. “Drive them into the river!” was the order.

When Jefferson Davis had determined to remove Joseph Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee several months prior he was already favorable to John Bell Hood of Virginia. Davis asked Robert E. Lee for his opinion/recommendation on Hood. Lee could not give a recommendation. While acknowledging Hood’s bravery and excellence as a subordinate commander he wrote this cautionary statement, “He is all the lion, and none of the fox.”
Yes, Sir!
The senior commanders of the Army of Tennessee saluted smartly and went back to their units. Cleburne, the dutiful subordinate and brilliant commander stating, “We will take the works or fall in the attempt.”
Pat Cleburne, the great division commander, loved by his men and feared and respected by the enemy walked back to his units with his friend and subordinate Brig. Gen Daniel Govan. They both knew that the coming battle would be a savage one- Cleburne had made a detailed reconnaissance of the union lines, while Hood at not. Govan and Cleburne knew that this could well be their last battle. Having survived for so long, so conspicuously at the front of his men, many of his friends and countrymen thought that he somehow was charmed, immune. But no one is immune.
As they walked back to Cleburne’s division to form them up for the coming attack Govan said, “Well, General, it looks like we may not get back to Arkansas.”
Cleburne replied, “If we are to die, let us die like men.” Cleburne would be killed within hours and within yards of the Union main line. When they learned that he had been killed in the attack many of his men were seen crying.
Where Was the Cavalry?
Forrest’s cavalry corp was divided, with several divisions fighting dismounted with the infantry. Forrest crossed the Harpeth river with plans to flank the union army and take the Nashville/Franklin pike in their rear, blocking Schofield’s retreat route. Now greatly outnumbered (generally acknowledged as 2:1) Forrest fought Wilson’s Union cavalry on the east bank of the Harpeth as Hood’s army smashed into the Carter House lines. Out gunned and overwhelmed by numbers, Forrest’s flanking movement failed. By 1864 Union cavalry was better equipped, and better led than they had been only a year before. Union cavalry could take on Forrest, and acquit itself well. General James Wilson, Forrest’s opponent at Franklin, was one of the leading lights of the new Union cavalry. This was one of the few times in the War that Forrest was bested by Union horsemen. Had Forrest’s cavalry not been split up, had he been granted the requested two infantry divisions and assaulted the Union left across the Harpeth River Schofield would very likely have been driven out of his lines. This often overlooked aspect of the Battle of Franklin is critically important, as it is another critical “what if” of that terrible carnage.

Schofield, in his memoirs Forty-six Years in the Army wrote,
“But, much more serious, Hood might cross the river above Franklin with a considerable force of infantry, as well as with all his cavalry, before I could get my materials over and troops enough to meet
him on the north side.”“In my report of the battle of Franklin I gave all the information in my possession of the gallant action of our cavalry in driving that of the enemy back across the Harpeth at the very time when his infantry assault was decisively repulsed.”
Schofield notes that the failure of Confederate cavalry and the success of Wilson in checking Forrest was instrumental in saving the day for the Union army at Franklin. Had Hood only listened to Forrest, the cavalry contest on the east bank of the Harpeth may well have turned out quite differently, and the entire battle as well.
Almost Home
-Character and Command-
Lee knew that megalomania, egotism, executive interference, and micromanagement are horrible impediments to effective leadership – that they cause more problems than they could ever possibly cure, that they demoralize subordinates and make them timid, and that they are based on the terrible fallacy that one central authority, with inevitably imperfect knowledge, should overrule officers in the field who are better acquainted with the actual detail of the battle.
Robert E. Lee on Leadership, H.W. Crocker III, Forum/Prima, 1999
With no mounted cavalry in the main portion of the battle, and with Forrest’s cavalry hindered by reduced numbers in their flank attack across the Harpeth, and with the main body of the artillery still with Stephen D. Lee on the road, the battle at Franklin became an infantry contest noted for its brutality and high Confederate casualties.
The Confederate charge down Winstead Hill began in the falling light of late afternoon and was the last grand Confederate charge of the war-20,000 men, 100 regiments in a line almost two miles across. The bands playing martial music, the regimental flags fluttering in the mild late afternoon November twilight, the winter sunlight glinting on gun metal and bayonets. It was an astounding site that awed soldiers on both sides.
Lt. Mohrmann of the 72nd Illinois said:
I (was)…on the left near the (Columbia) pike. Here a couple of guns threw shells at the rebel line of skirmishers coming towards us from the hills. Behind them came in splendid order, banners flying, drums beating, the enemy in line of battle, as beautiful an array in active war as I have witnessed. Their skirmish line halted and commenced firing.”
-Eyewitnesses at the Battle of Franklin, D.R. Logsdon, Kettle Mills Press, 2000
They came on down into the valley for two miles, twice the distance of “Pickett’s Charge” at Gettysburg. There would be no Gettyburg-style massive artillery barrage to prepare the way. Only several cannon were engaged on the Confederate side during the entire battle and were of little consequence to it. Very soon after stepping off from Winstead Hill the Confederate lines were under fire from the advanced Union lines of Wagner, then the main line at the Carter House and, almost the entire time, from the guns at Fort Grainger high on a bluff across the river north of the town.
The frustration and anger in the lines at the escape of Schofield the previous day at Spring Hill must have been palpable. The Confederates knew that if Schofield were to escape them now and get behind the heavy fortifications of Union-held Nashville, he was likely out of their hands for good. This desperate charge at Franklin must be successful! Many of the men in the ranks were from middle Tennessee, many were from Franklin itself. The desire to liberate Franklin and destroy the Union army drove these men forward. It is the foot soldier’s worst scenario-attacking an entrenched line fully manned and covered by artillery. But they came on and on.
As daylight sank away the first line was overrun. Chasing the survivors of the advanced line (Wagner’s) the Confederates screamed “Into the works with them!” Down the Columbia Pike they chased the fleeing Union soldiers. Where now a new county library stands a killing ground of shooting, bayoneting, and horrific violence was created.
Hundreds of union soldiers are killed here, hundreds more surrender – and on the Confederates charge, the Union main line holding their fire for as long they can wait so that their comrades can get behind the barricades.
Into the Works
In fact, the Union main line at the Carter House was broken, then retaken. Union witnesses counted 17 distinct charges made against the Carter House line, only for each to be thrown back in turn. The five bloodiest hours of the Civil War, much of it in darkness, the carnage at Franklin was overshadowed soon after by the total defeat of the Army of Tennessee at Nashville in the only true “total victory” of the War.
The fighting at Franklin was often hand-to-hand with stories of incredible daring and bravery recorded on both lines. The casualties for the South, appalling. Six generals including Cleburne, dead before the Carter House line; almost all regimental commanders killed or wounded. Thousands lay on the field in the dark after the battle ground to a halt at around 11pm, and the Union army quietly evacuated Franklin and hurried to the protection of Nashville’s fortifications. The numbers of Civil War battle casualties are rarely if ever exact. The Carter House website describes the Confederate casualty count as follows:
“More than 1,750 men were killed outright or died of mortal wounds, 3,800 seriously wounded and 702 captured (not including cavalry casualties). 15 out of 28 Confederate Generals were casualties. 65 field grade officers were lost. Some infantry regiments lost 64 % of their strength at Franklin. There were more men killed in the Confederate Army of Tennessee in the 5- hour battle than in the 2-day Battle of Shiloh and the 3-day Battle of Stones River.”
Total Confederate casualties at Franklin including missing, killed, and prisoner were 7,000, Union casualties were 2,500.
In the early morning hours, Hood rode down Winstead Hill and into the town. Observing the empty Union lines, the devastating cost of the attack and the hollow victory of the Schofield’s again escaping Union army, he sat on his horse and cried. How could he not? The great hero of Gettysburg, Antietam, Chickamauga and other battlefields had all but destroyed his army.
“The comparative smallness of the opposing armies is likely to lead to an under estimate of the desperate character of the fighting. The analysis of the forces engaged in the actual attack and defense will come later. It is enough now to note the fact that Hood had more men killed at Franklin than died on one side in some of the great conflicts of the war here three, four, or even five times as many men were engaged. His killed were more than Grant’s at Shiloh, McClellan’s in the Seven-days’ battle, Burnside’s at Fredericksburg, Rosecrans’s at Stone’s River or at Chickamauga, Hooker’s at Chancellorsville, and almost as many as Grant’s at Cold Harbor. The concentration in time, in those few hours of a winter afternoon and evening, makes the comparison still more telling.”
Major General Jacob Cox (in tactical command of the Union Army in Franklin, while Schofield was across the Harpeth River at Fort Grainger) “The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee-A Monograph”, 1897.
Almost Home
Had Emerson Opdyke not disobeyed Wagner’s order to man the advanced (and stupidly exposed) Union line he would not have been in position to counter-attack in the Carter House yard, directly at the point where the Confederates had broken the line on the first rush to the works. Opdyke would likely have been cashiered or charged with disobedience to orders instead of being in the right place at the right time to stop the Confederate breakthrough. The fighting in and around the Carter House and Cotton Gin has been described by the participants, almost all of them veterans, as likely the most horrific they had experienced during the War. It was truly, a kind of hell there.
The entire concept of the frontal assault at Franklin was an error and runs counter to most accepted concepts of military tactics (despite Jacob Cox’s comments to the contrary in his 1897 Monograph).
Opdyke’s presence north of the Carter House, in position to respond to the break-through there and drive the Confederates back, was pure chance. Battles are not won on chance, though they are stoked by it. Battles are won by superior planning, and by creating the environment in which chance can better thrive for one’s own purposes. Hood’s decisions have been deconstructed and criticized by many authors. This is not my mission here, but a review of the character of Hood as commander is.

Having the benefit of two of the greatest subordinate commanders in Confederate service in his army, Cleburne and Forrest, in addition to Cheatham, himself a respected commander -all advising against the frontal attack at Franklin, Hood instead choose to ignore them. Some have argued that Hood believed Schofield hadn’t enough time to properly dig in at Franklin thus leaving him vulnerable to a rapid and vigorous direct assault. But Schofield had the benefit of previously constructed earthworks at Franklin, built only the year before – he only had to fall in behind them, and rapidly shore them up, which he did. Forrest knew about these works, having fought in nearby Brentwood and all ’round that section of Tennessee prior to the Franklin battle. Hood must also have known about these pre-existing fortifications that now faced his army. He must have, there can be no excuse for him not to know.
It is difficult to hate General Hood, though it is hard to forgive him for not knowing his own limitations, for not accepting the advice of his highly qualified subordinates, etc. The loss of a leg at Chickamauga the previous year, and the use of an arm at Gettysburg, would tend to preclude him from high command on physical disability grounds alone. It seems reasonable to assume that his recuperation had not been completed and that he was physically incapable of the rigors of high command. There were others better qualified, and Hood should have accepted the truth and stayed in Richmond to continue his convalescence. But if not only his physical wounds then certainly his lack of the appropriate character traits made him unfit for army command as Franklin and then Nashville would clearly demonstrate.
Lee’s assessment of Hood had been insightful and prescient. The image of Hood after the battle crying by the side of Columbia Pike in Franklin resonates strongly with me. His sad face practically jumps from every portrait – a face of determination, but deep sadness and melancholy. Having been elevated in large part by his own machinations, to a position surpassing his ability to successfully perform, Hood was quickly on a dark path. His great moment of victory slipped from his grasp at Spring Hill, his absurd conceit that the men weren’t aggressive and wouldn’t charge entrenched lines often previously voiced would be forever dispelled at Franklin. And with that so would the army itself.
Frankin was the end of the end – a spiral of reverses and defeats for the Army of Tennessee having begun with the fall of Atlanta, and concluded with total defeat at Nashville.

Nashville, a battle that should not have happened after the disaster at Franklin, was the closure to Confederate efforts of any large scale in the western theater. It was the end of an era, and the end of the Confederacy in that region.
[As a side note when I first arrived in Nashville some years ago, I was fortunate to work nearby to the anchor point of the Confederate position on the first day at Nashville, December 14th, 1864, Redoubt Number 1. The utter wrongness of Hood's Nashville strategy has been written about extensively elsewhere. When I spoke to my colleagues about the Battle of Nashville they were, in the main, completely unaware that such a battle had occurred.]
The site of Redoubt Number 1, the anchor of Hood’s thin line of the first day of that battle, is now part of a fashionable neighborhood and is abutted by very lovely homes, where Yanks and Southerners live side by side, and Nashville continues to grow – having been a Confederate city for less than two years.
A Speech to the Army
Sometimes great ventures begin poorly and all the while everyone is trying to recover from the misstep. Thus it was with Hood’s Invasion of Tennessee.
Sam Watkins mentions a stump speech delivered to his regiment in Palmetto, Georgia by Jefferson Davis on September 25, 1864, prior to the move into Tennessee. This speech is also documented elsewhere, including Shelby Foote’s “The Civil War: A Narrative”.
“Soon we commence our march to Kentucky and Tennessee. Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward, and your feet will press Tennessee soil, and you will tread your native heath, amid the blue-grass regions and pastures green of your native homes. We will flank General Sherman out of Atlanta, tear up the railroad and cut off his supplies, and make Atlanta a perfect Moscow of defeat to the Federal army.”
President Jefferson Davis at Palmetto, GA as quoted in Sam Watkins, Company Aytch
This boastful speech and obvious plan for invasion was soon known to interested parties at the North. Northern commanders and planners were thus forewarned in much the same way that the Lost Orders at Antietam gave McClellan an undeserved and barely utilized advantage two years previous. As Hood marched north away from Sherman, away from the disasters of Atlanta, Sherman said, “Damn him. If he will go to the Ohio River I will give him rations….Let him go north. My business is down south.” (Foote, The Civil War-A Narrative, Vol 3, p613)
Sherman defiantly ignored Hood’s march behind him and went forward with his own devastating plans marching instead to the coast and destroying whatever he could in his path either by consumption or by fire. Thomas at Nashville was waiting and, with the knowledge kindly given him by Davis himself, knew for an almost certainty that Hood was on his way.
Considered one of the finest and most organized commanders in the Union army, Thomas had sealed his reputation at Chickamauga for his stand at Snodgrass Hill which prevented the total defeat of Rosecrans’ army there. This was the same battle in which Hood, commanding a division in Longstreet’s Corp, had lost his right leg. Thomas, a former professor at West Point while Hood was a cadet, had only to hold Nashville and await Hood behind his fortifications – the most heavily fortified city on the continent 2nd only to Washington, DC. Just two weeks after the disaster at Franklin, Hood would sit just south of Nashville in long barely-manned lines, daring Thomas to attack. It would be another mistake that would finally destroy the remnants of the once mighty Army of Tennessee. The Battle of Nashville is rightfully called the only “decisive victory” of the entire war with the destruction of the Army of Tennessee its result.
A Failure to Commemorate – Renewed Efforts to Save What Little Remains
Despite many calls for the creation of a National Military Park at Franklin, or the mounting of commemorative monuments there, (most notably in the Confederate Veteran Magazine at the turn of the century), little has happened there but growth. Franklin is now a bustling beautiful town of more than 50,000, anchored by corporate colonies and headquarters in nearby Cool Springs. The seat of Williamson County, Franklin is picturesque with friendly folks and lovely scenery.
There is little of the battlefield that remains. Only recently has the location of Patrick Cleburne’s heroic death just yards from the Cotton Gin been given proper commemoration by the installation of a cannonball pyramid to mark the place. It is illustrative of something (I don’t know what) to note that prior to this pyramid the site was covered by the parking lot of a Pizza Hut restaurant.
The current residents of Franklin and concerned citizens across the country now have ambitious plans to save what remains of the battleground. The area around Carnton (noted for its Confederate Cemetary in which 1480 Confederate casualties of Franklin are buried, many in mass graves) in particular is a worthy target of preservationists. One cannot blame earlier generations of Franklin residents for not wanting to commemorate that horrible day in November, 1864.
They all knew then, as the commanding general did not, that the Battle of Franklin was the end of their hopes, of their army, and their national struggle. The town of Franklin first had to survive the memory of the battle and its bitter ugly aftermath before they could properly commemorate it. Now, so long after, they are doing just that.
And so the Army of Tennessee having just suffered 7000 casualties marched forward out of Franklin north on the Franklin pike to Nashville chasing Schofield again who had already stolen the march and reached the safety of Nashville’s fortifications. Two weeks would pass, then the fresh Union troops behind the earthworks and fortresses of Nashville would pour out of their positions and finally shatter the Army of Tennessee. The Confederates retreated south rapidly, disorganized but for the rear guard, back over the battleground of Franklin where the carcass of General Adams’ horse still straddled the works in front of the Carter cotton gin.
Where was the Confederate cavalry at Franklin?
Commanded by the greatest cavalry commander of the war, the Confederate cavalry played but a small role in that horrible battle, despite the entreaties of its commander who pleaded for two divisions and two hours, and was given neither. Where was the artillery? The Southern artillery at Franklin was limited to two batteries. The bulk of the army’s guns were still on the road and hadn’t yet arrived in Franklin when the battle began. Hood could not, would not wait for his artillery. When the fighting died down towards midnight of the 30th Hood’s plan was to form a line of 100 guns and blast the Yankees out of their lines on the morning of December 1st. But the Yankees had already left.

There would be no artillery barrage at Franklin to precede the charge, as at Gettysburg. The bands played, then stopped as the men steeled themselves for the steel hurricane to come. Confederate Generals Patrick Cleburne, Otto Strahl, Hiram Granbury (formerly Granberry), States Rights Gist, and John Adams would die as would 2000 others. General John Carter (no relation to the Carter house family) would be mortally wounded at the works, and die 10 days later not accepting the doctors’ opinions that his wounds were mortal, hoping beyond hope to survive. And nothing was accomplished, nothing gained.Nothing but tears, graves, and the bitter results of bad planning, rash decisions, and rife egotism on the part of the commanding general.
The loss of Cleburne to the Army of Tennesse was as devastating as the loss of Jackson to the Army of Northern Virginia. The fighting at Franklin would long be remembered by almost every participant as particularly unforgettable for it’s close combat in the dark of night savagery.
Ignoring Cleburne, Forrest, and Cheatham and ordering a frontal assault into an entrenched enemy position across two miles of open ground with no cover, no artillery support and no reserve of cavalry is foolhardy and reckless and against fundamental concepts of military science. And the officers said, “Yes sir, we will take those works or die in the attempt!”
The absence of the cavalry led by Forrest at Franklin will be a mistake repeated just a week later when Forrest is ordered away from the Nashville area to Murfreesboro on a misbegotten raid. The Confederacy could ill afford General Hood and his plans. All the lion and none of the fox. Lee was right, and far away.
It is difficult to hate Hood, a hero of so many battlefields, so grievously wounded and so long suffering for his country and so desirous of doing his duty. To want what one ought not to ask for is bad enough, but to ask for it, and know somewhere deeply that others are better qualified or deserving is worse. So sad, and melancholic and haunted in his later war portraits, Hood appears a devastated man. One can almost imagine him thinking of Franklin, and Nashville when one sees these photographs. Hood is an embittered man, a man whose country is done though not for his best efforts to save it. As a man elevated to a position for which he was not qualified, it is not too much of a stretch to try to understand him and his motivations at Spring Hill and Franklin. The “Peter Principle” has rarely been better illustrated. It is hard to be angry with General John Bell Hood, but it is just as difficult to forgive him.
“From about four o’clock until dark the battle of Franklin raged with unsurpassed fury. It has passed into history as one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War as far as the Confederates were concerned. Never in the history of any war did troops, both officers and men, fight with more desperate valor than upon this field of slaughter. The generals vied with the enlisted men in the recklessness with which they offered up their lives in the heroic yet vain struggle for victory.”
Life of Forrest by John Allan Wyeth, 1908
In addition to those works referenced in the text, the following are of moment:
Carnton
Carter House
Save the Franklin Battlefield
Franklin’s Charge
Battle of Nashville Preservation Society
Civil War Historian Visits Franklin Battleground
Favorable view of General Hood at Franklin
Eric Jacobson’s excellent study of Spring Hill and Franklin
Superb collection of online resources
Peter Principle
Lost Orders at Antietam
