I agree with you that Hood has been dealt with rather sharply by modern historians regarding this battle. Hood is a great hero, having suffered exceedingly for his country. I am a fan of his. I think the people of the south were utterly shattered by the costs of Franklin, and Hood, being the commander had to take responsibility as a good commander should. However, when he came down from Winstead Hill and saw the results of the battle, he did cry. This was noted by several witnesses. Hood, like Lee, was not a man of marble. Had he been successful at Franklin, all my posts and likely a good bit of American history would be quite different. I appreciate very much you putting me in the same sentence as Cartwright, Fraley, Jacobson, and Mr. Sam Hood. I am honored, indeed.

Most Sincerely,
Daniel

I would like to share a personal opinion about the potential for a successful flanking movement by Forrest as described in your essay.

First of all, I think events of the day before at Spring Hill demonstrated the futility of such a tactic. Forrest had come tantalyzingly close to reaching Spring Hill ahead of Union forces, but ultimately was turned back by a relatively small force of infantry (and ran out of ammunition in attempting to dislodge them). IF Forrest could have crossed the Harpeth at Franklin he likely couldn’t have gotten into a threatening position much before darkness fell. It’s a long way around. Secondly, the Harpeth was running high, which would have made it very difficult for any accompanying infantry (which I realize he didn’t request) to bolster the strength of a flanking attack and render it a more viable option. Had Hood been sympathetic to such a manuever he would have been dividing his force in presence of the enemy, which we know was a principle seldom violated during the war (Although Lee was a master at it…especially when Jackson was alive). And of course, infantry would have taken considerably longer to affect a crossing. Thirdly, by noon on the 30th, Wood’s Division had crossed to the north side of the Harpeth with substantial units of infantry and artillery…not to mention the long range guns manned at Fort Grainger…and was in position to repel a cavalry advance had Forrest crossed the river.

I would really enjoy a serious forum on this issue with you and Thomas Cartwright, David Fraley, Eric Jacobson, Sam Hood, etc….if studied in depth with timelines and topographical maps such a discussion might truly clear the air!

I’ve always looked upon the tactic denied Forrest by General Hood as a typical example of post war second-guessing; a “stretch” for some to further indict Hood for the failure at Franklin.

On a different note…I also feel that much of the vindictive rhetoric aimed at Hood was fueled by the fact that so many bright young men of Tennessee fell on home ground. That truly had to be hard to take.

I admire your essays and will be a frequent visitor.

For readers who care to take the time, here is the other side of the story.

Few figures in American history have been subjected to the level of malevolent mischaracterization that is now directed at John Bell Hood, commander of Confederate forces at the Battles of Franklin and Nashville in 1864. Astonishingly, these false and incomplete portrayals are frequently perpetuated by a small but influential group of academicians whose very professions demand accuracy and full factual disclosure. Many of these guardians of our nation’s heritage, in an effort to draw attention to their particular theories, engage in exaggeration and in concealment or selective disclosure of pertinent facts. Like a skillful lawyer who seeks to sway a jury, they disclose information that supports their positions, while concealing information that weakens or impeaches those assertions. Victims of such practices include other historians, who naively accept their colleagues’ accounts as factual and incorporate them into their accounts and portrayals. As English historian Philip Guedalla wrote in 1920, “History repeats itself. Historians repeat each other.”

Sadly, many professional historians and historical organizations ignore or betray the Standards of Ethical Conduct of the American Historical Association, which state, “As intellectual diversity enhances historical imagination and contributes to the development and vitality of the study of the past, historians should welcome rather than deplore it. When historians make interpretations and judgments, they should be careful not to present them in a way that forecloses discussion of alternative interpretations.” Unfortunately, many false and misleading assertions regarding Gen. Hood’s role in the 1864 Tennessee Campaign are accepted without honest intellectual debate by many modern historians and have become historical “reality,” notwithstanding evidence to the contrary.

Historical institutions themselves have been pulled into the vortex of revisionism. The official websites of multiple Franklin and Nashville area public historical entities describe Hood as “a firm believer in frontal assaults” even when informed that Franklin was the only frontal assault Hood ever ordered as an independent army commander. The City of Franklin’s own historical marker at Winstead Hill Park states that “In a fit of rage (Hood) sacrificed his own men” and “gained his revenge” for the lost opportunity at Spring Hill. The unknown author of that marker parrots the myth of an enraged Hood and ignores the historical record, which reveals that Hood, although described as “wrathy as a rattlesnake” in the early morning of Nov. 30, and contentious during his meeting at the Harrison House before the battle – was pensive and composed during the rest of the day. Eyewitness Sumner A. Cunningham of the 41st Tennessee Infantry wrote in the April, 1893 issue of Confederate Veteran magazine, “While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines…but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge.”

….

[Note from Dan:

This thorough defense of General Hood, kindly posted by Sam Hood of Johnbellhood.org, is both longer than the original post itself and available in exactly the same form on Mr. Hood's site at this URL:
http://www.johnbellhood.org/indefense.htm

I've therefor taken the liberty of providing the link above for interested readers and limiting the length of the comment/post here. I mean no disrespect to Mr. Hood by doing this and hope that all interested readers will follow the link provided to review Mr. Hood's defense of the General which comes to very different conclusions than my own.

As a side note, I believe that for most serious students of this battle the importance of Mr. Sword's book on the subject is somewhat overstated.]