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Unraveling a Civil War Mystery

Whereby Sloppy Generalship Leads to Near Disaster for the Union Army in the West

Oh my God! This awful awful day!

by Daniel Mallock

In the shade of a linden tree at the crest of Winstead Hill, General Hood, commander of the Army of Tennessee, made the fateful decision to assault the Union lines at Franklin, TN., November 30, 1864. The Confederate army, shattered by staggering losses of officers and men, including 5 generals killed on the field would the next day incredibly march north to Nashville and dare General Thomas commanding that place to face them in open battle. This is exactly what Thomas did and the shattering that began in Franklin was finished there on the south side of Nashville with the survivors of the now broken and defeated Confederate army retreating past the graves of their comrades hastily buried in the cold fields of Franklin just two weeks previously.

Controversy over the decision to attack at Franklin has been ongoing since the end of the War with partisans for General Hood, a hero of many battlefields who suffered grievously for the Confederacy, defending him and lauding him for what would have been an astounding victory had he been successful. One of the more shocking aspects of the Battle of Franklin is how close Hood actually came to breaking Schofield’s lines at the Carter House and driving the Union army into the swollen Harpeth River two miles in their rear.

Among Hood’s defenders is none other than his former West Point classmate and opponent at Franklin, General John S. Schofield. Writing in his memoirs “Forty-Six Years in the Army” Schofield could not have been more complimentary to his former enemy and nemesis:

General Schofield , commander US army at Battle of Franklin

“Hood must therefore attack on November 30, or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides, our position, with the river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary.”

Schofield was not mincing any words here. Hood was justified, Hood had no other reasonable options, etc. Schofield’s clarity here as compared with his vagaries regarding the placement of Wagner’s division in the advanced position prior to the battle’s opening are more difficult to come to terms with. Schofield is a verbose writer. To say that his is a self-serving memoir may be too harsh, but not altogether inaccurate. Many of the post-war memoirs can be characterized thusly. It is a gentlemanly thing to compliment the beaten foe for his bravery and skill, it is quite another however to strongly censure subordinates without proof, as shall be seen later.

General George Wagner, commanding Union rear guard at Franklin

It is important to note that the works that Schofield describes as “slight” were considered extremely formidable by most every Confederate officer who did a reconnaissance on them including Forrest, Cheatham, and Cleburne. Some later said, on both sides, it was the best defensive position they had ever seen in the war. Moscow Carter, a paroled Confederate Colonel residing at the Carter House, described the works as “formidable”. According to Isaac Shannon, of the 9th Tennessee, General Cleburne observed the Union lines through a telescope and said aloud, “They have three lines of works, and they are all completed.” The consensus in both armies was that the positions at the Carter House line were formidable and complete, offering protection to the defenders and certain hazard to any force attacking them. Schofield in his memoirs does not share this view, having scant confidence in the works as they are, as he states, of the “slightest character”.

This negative opinion by the Union commander of his defenses at Franklin as stated in his memoirs is likely the same one he had on the day of the battle. A prudent general with his back to a river facing a determined foe would do exactly what Schofield then likely did - he tried to give himself and his men more time to improve the defensive line.

Is there some confusion here on Schofield’s part, a lapse of memory? No, this is unlikely. Schofield’s rear guard was commanded by George Wagner, a veteran of many battles, but not a West Pointer. Wagner’s division consisted of three brigades. Is it likely that Schofield ordered his rear guard under Wagner to give the army at the works more time? There is evidence that Schofield was panicked and had lost his composure at Franklin. There was a very real possibility that he could not hold the Carter line and Hood would have the town, and destroy his army.

General Schofield, absent from the front lines during the entire Battle of Franklin

But at the time Schofield was confident that Hood would make a flank attack and not risk a direct assault. This is why he felt the best place for him would be at Fort Granger, some two miles behind the Carter line. If Schofield was right, Wagner’s advanced position could be the forward line of a flank strike of his own against Hood as he wheeled his army to the right to cross the Harpeth below Franklin. And if he was wrong, and Hood wrecklessly charged straight down the Columbia pike to the “slight” works at the Carter house line, Wagner and his division would be there to blunt the charge and buy more time for the defenders on the main line. For the commander, this was a reasonable decision, but for Wagner and his men, it was a total disaster and almost led to the defeat of Schofield’s army at Franklin.

Everyone knew, on both sides, that Wagner’s forward position was untenable

The placement of Wagner’s division is the central mystery of the Battle of Franklin. It is agreed by participants and students of the battle that this was a blunder, and opprobrium and blame quickly fell on Wagner as the responsible party. But it is more likely that he was following direct orders from the army’s commander to take an advanced position and hold it, to provide more time for the construction of the main entrenchments that Schofield believed were “slight”. The historical record is muddled on this matter and likely for explainable reasons - careers and reputations were at stake.

With bands playing, one hundred and more flags fluttering and the setting sun highlighting bayonets and banners, the scene could not have been more thrilling, and awe inspiring. S. A. Cunningham, later the editor of Confederate Veteran magazine perhaps said it most succinctly when he said to a friend years later, as they walked together along the now disappeared line of Union works at the Carter House, “The whole scene was the most thrilling that I ever saw in war.”

General John Bell Hood, commander of Army of Tennessee at Franklin

“Franklin was the last opportunity he (Hood) could expect to have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost. I believe, therefore, that there can be no room for doubt that Hood’s assault was entirely justifiable. It may have been faulty in execution, in not having been sufficiently supported by a powerful reserve at the moment of first success.”
(Schofield, 46 Years in the Army, - p.184)

Most everyone involved in the events of that day who saw the Army of Tennessee form up at the foot of the Winstead Hills and march forward in battle array were more than impressed. The Confederate advance was like an irresistible wall, a moving storm. And directly in the path of this seeming unstoppable human wave arrayed for death, destruction and killing were 2/3 of General George D. Wagner’s division digging their trenches furiously, mindful of the sergeants with their bayonets keeping them in place. Some three thousand men were there some 500 yards in advance of the Union main line, swearing, yelling, screaming that a terrible mistake had been made, and that their lives would be thrown away for someone’s stupidity and incompetence.

Wagner’s advanced position is flanked on both sides, the position will be overrun creating the crisis that culminated around the Carter House

Just as Hood must take responsibility for the outcome of his battles so must Schofield as the commander of the Union army. Having gone to Fort Granger several hours prior to the opening assault, expecting a flanking attack across the Harpeth which would place the critical point of the battle in the front of that artillery emplacement high on Figuers Bluff which commanded the approaches to the town and the road to Nashville with its guns, Schofield was not in tactical command during the battle. James Cox was in command at the line. His own memoirs on the battle are also vague when responsibility for Wagner’s forward position and disposition of his division is discussed.

General Jacob Cox, 23rd Corps commander and in actual command on the field at Franklin in Schofield’s absence from the front

Cox does not say who issued the orders to Wagner, nor does Schofield. Resigning from the army due to the controversy of his actions at Franklin, before Thomas could cashier him, Wagner left no record as to whose orders in particular he was following, and the specifics of those orders. So, what have we left to make a determination? We have eyewitness accounts, and the vagaries of memoirists who, on other occasions, are extremely detailed in their recollections. When great errors are made, and disasters narrowly averted and lives stupidly wasted - as the men of Wagner’s division surely were - somebody must be made to pay and justice done, and the investigations of course, stopped.

Schofield explained the disposition of Wagner’s division thusly:

“while Wagner’s division, which had acted as rear-guard from Spring Hill, was ordered to remain far enough in front of the line to compel Hood to disclose his intention to attack in front or to turn the position, and was to retire and take its position in reserve at the proper time, if the enemy formed for attack.”
(Schofield, 46 years in the Army)

But Schofield does not say who issued the orders to Wagner, and what those orders specifically were.

Cox, in his memoirs, covers himself here:

“Meeting him (Wagner) in the road in front of the Carter house, he confirmed the information that the enemy was probably forming for an assault. I reminded him of his orders not to leave his brigades out too long, and warned him of the dangers that would come from a hurried retreat. I then rode off to the left.”
Cox, Battle of Franklin, Monograph, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1897

Again, Cox does not specify the original orders to Wagner. According to participants and survivors, Wagner’s forward line was in place for two hours with the men frantically digging in with spades they had stolen from a broken down wagon they had passed as they marched on the road to Franklin. Cox, according to his own statements, says that he was taking care of emplacements in front of the Carter House for a good part of that time. The sight line to Wagner’s forward line from the Carter House was unbroken at that time. If Wagner’s orders were to withdraw when the Confederates showed their hand, ie to attack in force, why didn’t General Cox send a courier to Wagner to have him withdraw to the works immediately? Cox, the general in command on the field as Schofield was almost three miles in the rear at Fort Granger, was responsible for ensuring obedience to Schofield’s orders. The fact that no courier was sent by Cox is instructive. Is it possible that Wagner was indeed obeying Schofield’s orders by holding the forward and terribly exposed position? In his monograph on the battle Cox quotes a letter from General Bradley, dated 11/13/1889, in which Bradley criticizes Wagner’s military judgment.

There has never been any doubt in my mind since then as to the responsibility for the exposed position of the two brigades of the Fourth Corps in front of the lines. It was one of the vagaries of Wagner’s mind that an assault in force should be resisted by the pickets in front of a fortified line, and I remember a difference I had with him at Columbia, where it was thought we might be attacked when I was in charge of the picket lines. I felt justified then in saying to him that if Hood’s army attacked, I should retire the pickets after giving information of the enemy’s movement.
General L.P. Bradley (letter of 11/13/1889) quoted in Cox, Monograph, 1897

Unfortunately, General Bradley by his own statement places himself in the town during the fighting - not on the battle line, so he may well have had no way of knowing at all who issued the order(s) to Wagner and of what the orders consisted. His statement that Wagner preferred to challenge advancing assaults with pickets is contrary to Civil War military doctrine and would not be countenanced for long by any officer commanding Wagner.

General Wagner would resign under threat of dismissal from General George Thomas in Nashville one week after the battle. He would die several years later.

The fact that Wagner was a division commander by his own efforts, ability and courage under fire tends to make one doubt the veracity of General Bradley’s criticism. But it does add to the muddle of the central issue of why Wagner was there with his division 500 yards in front of the main line at Franklin, and it adds to the criticism of character and performance of Wagner and casts a cloud of doubt upon him while diminishing any scrutiny of his superiors.

“I was not in the fight at Franklin, as you will remember, but was in the town when the battle was being fought.”
-Bradley (see above citation)

[Note: Bradley had been wounded at Spring Hill the previous day. Commander of one of Wagner's three brigade's he was in the town recuperating from his wounds while Colonel Conrad took temporary command of the brigade.)

Cox, building the case against Wagner, further quotes General David Stanley's Official Report of 2/25/1865, another division commander at Franklin, "General Wagner was instructed to fall back before the advance of the enemy, observing them."

Again, there is no mention of who gave Wagner his orders and the exact specifics in those orders.

General David Stanley, commander 4th corps at Franklin. Wounded during Opdyke's counter-charge he would receive the Medal of Honor for his efforts at Franklin.

General Cox in his Official Report of the Franklin Battle stated of Wagner: "He informed me that ... his orders then were to hold the enemy back until they developed a heavy force manifestly superior to his own, and then slowly retire within my lines."
(OR, 1/v45/pt1, p.352)

It certainly does not appear from Cox that Wagner was repeating Cox's own orders back to him, rather he was stating his orders as they came from Schofield, the only higher authority on the Union side at Franklin. As the army commander it is reasonable to assume that Schofield gave specific orders to Wagner who was acting as rear guard for the army, without specifically informing Cox or anybody else as to the specifics. This would not be unusual. However, if Schofield had ordered Wagner to hold his forward position as long as he could to give the army time to bolster a position in which Schofield had no confidence and described as "slight", this would tend to put the entire matter in a more understandable light and explain the vagaries of every Union army writer on the matter. The disaster that befell Wagner's men would have to be explained. If Schofield had given Wagner specific orders to hold... well, Schofield would be responsible for the clearly stupid mistake that almost cost the army its very survival.

Schofield made a point in his memoirs to use the Wagner situation at Franklin as a training point - the superiority of West Point trained officers to those without a military education in the classic sense. Wagner was not a West Point graduate. He had no formal military education. As an Indiana politician and agriculturist, Wagner was the classic "volunteer". Again we need to review Schofield's statement...

"...while Wagner's division, which had acted as rear-guard from Spring Hill, was ordered to remain far enough in front of the line to compel Hood to disclose his intention to attack in front or to turn the position, and was to retire and take its position in reserve at the proper time, if the enemy formed for attack."

Some have speculated that Schofield strongly believed that Hood would attempt a crossing of the Harpeth below the town (closest to the Confederate positions at Winstead) and attempt a flank attack towards the Franklin Pike to block the road, and Schofield's retreat route, to Nashville. Some have suggested that Wagner's advance line was a kind of reconnaissance in force, posted there to watch Hood and if the Confederates turned to the right or left to then attack the Confederates in flank. What indeed does Schofield mean when he states that Wagner's division was to "retire and take it's position in reserve at the proper time?

Schofield lavishly praises Wagner's disobedient brigade commander Colonel Emerson Opdyke (later General) and for good reason. Opdyke's charge likely saved the Union army at Franklin. Ironically, Opdyke's brigade was in position only because Opdyke had directly disobeyed Wagner's order to fall in with his men in the advanced (and soon to be overrun) line.

Colonel Emerson Opdyke (shown here as a general), commander of Wagner's third brigade refuses orders to fall in and is thereby at the right place and time to save the battle for the Union

As he concludes his memoir's discussion of Franklin and moves onto other aspects of his career in the army, Schofield acknowledges that some "idle" controversy was indulged in after the battle regarding the placement of Wagner's division. But for Schofield, the matter was settled. Thomas had reviewed the case, doubtless interviewing all those officers concerned, and accepted Wagner's resignation a week after Franklin. Wagner returned to Indiana and took up law. He would die several years later, some have said "heartbroken" by his broken reputation and lost career.

There is no record of Wagner's having requested a renewed investigation, and source material on this case is not extensive. Schofield would go on to a brilliant career, retiring as General of the Army. Wagner would die early, at age 40 in 1869. Schofield says of the conclusion of the matter:

"The only proper way to settle such a question was by a court-martial. As the corps passed from my command the next morning, and had been under my orders only a few days, I have never made any effort to fix, even in my own mind, the responsibility for that blunder."
Forty-Six Years in the Army, John M. Schofield, The Century Company, 1897

With a total lack of interest by Schofield, the resignation of Wagner, and the victory of Franklin itself as his firm foundation, Schofield would rise to the very top of the US Army itself. But many in the ranks would never forget Franklin, and Schofield's role in it, and would see Wagner's resignation (he resigned before Thomas could likely cashier him) in a more suspicious and unjust light.

More Controversy

Levi Scofield, no relation to the general in command wrote the following eyewitness account in his book The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville:

"The writer was standing on the parapet of the 100th Ohio Regiment, urging the men to strengthen their works, and talking with General Wagner. The General was reclining on his elbow, with a staff or crutch in his hand: he had fallen with his horse and was lame. We remarked that the musketry firing was becoming more rapid, also from the two guns in front. By-and-by a staff officer rode fast from one of the brigades, and reported excitedly, 'The enemy are forming in heavy columns. We can see them distinctly in the open timber and all along our front.' Wagner said firmly ' Stand there and fight them,' and then turning to me, said, 'And that stubbed, curly-headed Dutchman,' meaning one of his brigade commanders [General Conrad],’ will fight them too.’ ‘ But, General,’ the officer said,’ the orders are not to stand, except against cavalry and skirmishers; but to fall back behind the main line if a general engagement is threatened.’ In a short time another officer rode in from the right in great haste, and told him the Rebels were advancing in heavy force. He received the same order. The officer added,’ But Hood’s entire army is coming.’ Then Wagner struck the ground with his stick, and said ‘ Never mind: fight them!’ Soon we heard the Rebel yell and heavy firing.”
(as quoted in Bright Skies and Dark Shadows, Field, 1890)

According to Levi Scofield a staff officer reminded General Wagner of his orders, not to stand except against cavalry and skirmishers. Cox suggests that Wagner had been caught up in the excitement of the combat, and had lost his composure.

“…excited by the rapid approach of a crisis in the stirring events of the day, gave way to an impulse to fight the whole army of Hood upon the line of mere outposts. Such impulses, unfortunately, are not uncommon in officers who are brave enough, but who lack the power of calm self-control under fire.”
Jacob Cox, Battle of Franklin, Monograph, Charles Scribners’ Sons, 1897

Certainly this is excessive of General Cox. Wagner was no amateur though he was a volunteer and not a West Pointer. Having distinguished himself at previous battles he had been brevetted. Wagner was not known for “impulses”.

Cox continued that Thomas’ investigation proved that Wagner had been disobedient to his orders in instructing his brigades to stay and fight in the exposed forward line, 500 yards in front of the Carter House. According to Cox, Wagner’s orders to his subordinates were contrary to those given him by higher authority, apparently Schofield himself.

“General Thomas was forced to conclude that this loss of self-possession showed that he Wagner) was overweighted with the command of the division, especially as the brigade commanders had evidently lost confidence in his capacity.”
(Cox, see above)

But there is more, of course. Eisenschiml and Long in As Luck Would Have It (Bobbs-Merrill, 1948) report of the conversation between Opdyke commanding Wagner’s third division and the division commander.

As the final brigade of the Union rear guard Opdyke’s brigade was the last organized unit of Union soldiers to come down from the Winstead Hills into the valley of Franklin. Wagner’s first two divisions of Conrad and Lane had already deployed in the advanced and exposed line far in front of the main Carter House positions. Now it was Opdyke’s turn to fall in.

Opdyke, a vandyke bearded semi-balding highly capable Colonel of the 125th Ohio, now in brigade command had been over these fields before. The previous year Opdyke, like Forrest across the divide on the Winstead Hills, had fought in and around Franklin. He knew that Wagner’s exposed position was a suicidal one that could not be defended and would soon be overrun. This advanced line was nothing more than an impediment to the men in the main line from firing at the approaching Confederates. Essentially, Wagner’s position was in the way.

My Orders Are to Hold This Position

Flatly refusing Wagner’s command to man the position, Opdyke is now insubordinate and disobedient to a direct order, Long and Eisenschiml describe the exchange:

“You cannot mean that, General,” he (Opdyke) said.
“I do mean it,” Wagner shouted. “Please get into position.”
“Then I refuse to obey your order, sir,” Opdyke declared firmly.
The general’s face turned red. “You refuse to obey my order, Colonel?”
“I do. Your order, sir, is nothing short of suicidal….”
“You understand, Colonel, that I can have you court-martialed for this?”
“I do.”
The two men looked straight at each other.
“My orders are to hold this position,” General Wagner said after a few moments.

Opdyke did indeed disobey orders to man the forward position and instead marched his men behind the main Union line and rested them some 200 yards behind the Carter House and Cotton Gin. This was a momentous decision for the Union for when the Confederate breakthrough occured Opdyke’s men were roused from their rest by retreating men in blue and knew that things were going very wrong. Opdyke and his men spontaneously formed up, and charged - without orders to do so. But there were in the right place at the right time, and saved the day.

However for us, in this investigation, the critical question outstanding is who gave Wagner his orders to hold? The only likely answer is General Schofield.

Eisenschiml and Long believe that Wagner was “obeying an ambiguous order in the way that a brave man would interpret it. Poor fellow!”

In war mistakes are often made, and men die. That is the nature of war. Some are less forgiving than others, and less reluctant to take responsibility when the consequences of the taking can lead to unpleasant repurcusions.

As the Confederate wave broke over Wagner’s two advanced brigades, everyone in the Union lines knew that a terrible mistake had been made. Now, the men in the main line could not fire at the attacking Confederates without hitting their own men. And on they came til the advancing Confederates and retreating soldiers from Wagner’s forward line were mixed together so that in some sections of the main line, they came into the fortifications together.

This breakthrough was the moment of decision in the Battle of Franklin. Had Opdyke not disobeyed Wagner’s orders to man the foolishly exposed forward line his brigade would not have been in reserve to counter attack at exactly the right moment with a fury that would make Opdyke a hero and break the Confederate assault.

Where was Schofield?

While Hood was attacking from the front and so violently overturning Schofield’s closely held opinion that Hood would attempt a flank attack by crossing the river and trying another “run around” like the one at Columbia and Spring Hill, the Union commander was over a mile away from the front at the home of a Union sympathizer in the town. While at the Cliffe house in Franklin Schofield met with his corp commanders Stanley and Cox (Cox having tactical command of the army at the Carter House) with Wilson already in the saddle with his cavalry contingent, waiting for Forrest on the east bank of the Harpeth. During those meetings it would seem reasonable to assume that Cox informed Schofield of the massing of the Confederate army at the foot of the Winstead Hills, and the forward line held by Wagner’s understrength division. Yet no changes in the disposition of troops, specifically Wagner’s division, was ordered by Schofield.

When the sound of firing was heard, Schofield went across the river and made his headquarters at Fort Granger. This effectively took him entirely out of the battle so that all subsequent decisions on the Carter House line are made by Jacob Cox.

“When Stanley started for the front Schofield started for the rear, and the most charitable construction that can be placed upon his action, is that he interpreted the sound of the firing to mean that the expected flank movement had begun and that his duty called him across the river to provide against that flank movement.”
The Battle of Franklin By John K. Shellenberger, Capt, 64th Ohio, Paper read before the Minnesota Commandery of The Loyal Legion U.S., December 9, 1902.

Schofield’s personal absence from the field of battle is difficult enough to defend but his lack of composure can only be described as akin to panic.

“His disturbed mental condition at that time is disclosed by the fact that he abandoned in the room of Cliffe’s house where he had slept, his over-coat, gloves and a package containing the official dispatches he had received from General Thomas. These articles were not reclaimed until our army returned to Franklin after the victory at Nashville and in the meantime Mrs. Cliffe saved the coat from being taken by some needy rebel by wearing it herself and she also safely kept the gloves and dispatches.”
(Shellenberger, see above citation.)

But there was to be no general flanking attack by the Army of Tennessee against Schofield’s army that day at Franklin. They would assault right down the middle. Forrest had said to Hood before the assault, “Sir, Let me flank them out!” Whereupon Hood replied, “No, no, no! Charge them out!”

Nathan Bedford Forrest, commander of Confederate cavalry at Franklin suggests a flank assault but is refused

Shellenberger, a survivor of Wagner’s forward position certainly had good cause to be angry with the commanding general for the obvious mistake of posting Wagner in front of the main line. A captain of the 64th Ohio, he cites General Stanley as having vetted the accuracy of his observations (delivered as a lecture, then published as a monograph).

“His presence in the fort had no more to do with the repulse of Hood’s assault than if he had been the man in the moon looking down upon the battle field. The only order that he sent from the fort was the order to retreat after the army had won a great victory. ”
(Shellenberger, see above citation.)

Shellenberger is very clear, Schofield was not in the battle, was not in control, and was not issuing any commands during the battle relevant to the action at the main Union line around the Carter House. Most disturbingly Schofield was absent from the field during the two hour lead-up to the Confederate attack. Surely he was receiving reports of the activity in his front? It is known that Schofield grabbed an hour or so of sleep while at the Cliffe’s house in Franklin, perhaps he was exhausted from the previous day’s stress at Spring Hill, the flight to Franklin, the horrible shock of finding the expected pontoons missing, and the bridges across the Harpeth impassable without significant repairs-repairs that would take time which he did not have.

“What was Schofield doing those two hours? If he saw anything of Hood’s preparations he showed incompetence by his failure to promptly withdraw the two brigades from the blundering position to which he had assigned them. If he saw nothing of Hood’s preparations, it was only because of a criminal neglect of his duty at a time when the perilous position of his army, with a greatly superior rebel army in its front and a river at its back, demanded his utmost vigilance. It was said that General Stanley was sick but he spent the day with Schofield and he also, having had West Point experience of Hood’s character, concurred fully in Schofield’s belief that Hood would not assault (dan-down the center). So great was their delusion in this respect that it would not be shaken by the reports made by their subordinates, and nothing short of the loud road of the opening battle was able to arouse them into giving any personal attention to the situation. Then at last, when it was too late to do anything to remedy a blunder which already had gone so far that it must go on to its full culmination, Schofield and Stanley left the house of Dr. Cliffe.”
(Shellenberger, see above citation.)

Upon leaving the Cliffe house and riding quickly back to the main line, Stanley would find himself on horseback in the thick of Opdycke’s counter-charge. Wounded in the neck, he would recover to have a fine career in the military and would win the Medal of Honor for his efforts at Franklin. No disrepute would come to him from his performance at Franklin.

Later Stanley would besmirch Wagner by accusing him of drunkenness.

“Wagner was, to say the least, ‘full’ of whiskey, if not drunk… He was in a vainglorious condition, though it was not known at the time to General Schofield or myself.” (Eyewitnesses to the Battle of Franklin, Logsdon, Kettle Mills, 2000)

How then did he come to know this important fact later about his division commander of the forward line? He did not know it during the lead up to the battle? How can this be? Stanley was Wagner’s direct superior, how could he not know that his division commander was drunk while on duty commanding thousands of men about to go into combat? This makes little sense. Why has no other commentator said anything like this in the historical record - including Cox and Schofield. And so it begins to come into focus… Wagner is being “sacrificed” for the benefit of Schofield. This is an ugly business.

For Shellenberger, a survivor of the error that cost so many Union men their lives in the advanced line at Franklin wanted nothing less than Schofield’s court martial.

Schofield was still alive in 1902 when Shellenberger delivered his detailed account of Franklin to a likely astounded MOLLUS (Military Order of the Loyal Legion) audience in Minnesota. Schofield had only then recently retired as the commanding General of the US Army, following the footsteps of Sherman, and Grant in the same position having got the post after the death of Phil Sheridan. But injustice will have its due, in time, and 1902 was Shellenberger’s time. There is no mention in the histories of Schofield ever having been court-martialed for Franklin. But certainly Shellenberger and others put his later advancement in question on account of his mismanagement of the Battle of Franklin.

“schofield should be court-martialed…
Was it for the meritorious services he rendered by sitting idly in Cliff’s house and utterly ignoring the reports coming to him of Hood’s preparations for assault during the two hours that it
took Hood’s army to come up and get into position, and for the gallantry he displayed in crossing the river as soon as the fighting began, thereby abandoning to his subordinates
the conduct of the battle, that Schofleld claimed the promotion he got? If he had been accorded the reward which his conduct that day so justly merited it would have come in
the verdict of a court martial such as he declares in his book ought to have been given to Wagner, Lane and Conrad.”
(Shellenberger, see above citation.)

And What of Wagner?

We will likely never know the true contents of the orders that sent him 500 yards in front of the Union main entrenchments to have two of his brigades face the entire Confederate Army of Tennessee alone. It should be noted here that Wagner was not in the forward line himself but was at the nearby the Carter House with Cox much of the time. If Wagner was disobedient to the commanding general’s orders to withdraw why did Cox not order Wagner to withdraw? This is a mystery to which we will likely never know the answer, but we can speculate based upon the events of the battle and the comments from the participants.

Why would Schofield say that the entrenchments at Franklin were “slight” when all the Confederate senior officers recommended against a frontal assault against them because they were so formidable?

Was Wagner following specific orders to hold his advanced position because Schofield believed that no frontal assault was forthcoming or because he had such a lack of confidence in the Union works at Franklin that he was willing to sacrifice Wagner’s division to save the Army itself, to buy the army more time to dig in?

Why was no Union officer specific in their reports or later commentary as to who gave Wagner his orders and the specific contents of those orders?

Why was Wagner allowed to resign under threat of dismissal when others had ordered him to be where he was?

Why did Cox and Schofield besmirch Wagner’s character in their reports after Wagner had already since left the army?

Perhaps Shellenberger is correct, and perhaps so is W.W. Gist of the 26th Ohio, Lane’s Brigade, another survivor manning the forward line as the Confederate wave surges forward.

“Nearer and nearer the Confederates approached with the precision of dress parade, and our hearts beat rapidly. We wondered why we were not moved back to the works. It was plain that some one had blundered.”
(Eyewitnesses at the Battle of Franklin, Logsdon, Kettle Mills Press, 2000.)

When General Hood, commanding the Confederate Army was informed of the devastating losses of Cheatham’s Corp (50% losses) in the frontal assault on the Union lines his response is quoted by a Confederate artilleryman as, “o my god! this awful awful day!” Not only for the vanquished would Franklin be an awful awful day.

Epicenter of the Battle of Franklin, the Carter House. Moscow Carter would find 58 casualties in this yard early the next morning

This devastating battle still is the subject of controversy and the source of horrible conundrums. Never again would there be a grand charge on the north American continent such as the one first met by Wagner’s unfortunate brigades at Franklin. The fields of Franklin would bear the scars and the blood and wreckage of the battle for weeks and more, with the people of that lovely town struggling for generations to live in the shadow of the bloody carnage of the fight that dark night of November 30, 1864. We can only be awestruck still by the bravery of the men in blue and gray who fought and died in the thousands during those long long hours on those fields in the darkness.

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