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by Daniel Mallock

“The core assumptions of the post-cold war years collapsed almost as soon as they were formulated,” writes Robert Kagan in the Return of History and the End of Dreams (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008). This is accurate, but not entirely. Some assumptions that have been consistent for over ten centuries have never collapsed and are now, post 9/11 resurgent. The minimization and mischaracterization of the threat of expansionist political Islam is the central error in an otherwise excellent analysis and word portrait of likely things to come.

Kagan’s book is important not only because its author is one of John McCain’s leading foreign policy advisors but for its keen yet flawed understanding of geopolitics. So incisive in some areas, but so mistaken in others, Return of History and End of Dreams is a mixed success.

Most importantly Kagan’s confidence in the inevitable failure of Islamist goals is dangerously mistaken. At the core of Kagan’s book is the growing conflict between democracies and autocracies. The United States and Russia/China are at the center of these two opposing blocks, but this conflict is only half the battle that the United States faces.

The other battle is with Islamist terrorism and demographic expansion of non-assimilating Muslim immigrants, jihad does not necessarily require bombs. No less a definitive conflict than that with autocratic regimes the fight against the political ideology of Islam is as dire and important. It is critically important that the United States and our allies balance our attentions and resources between these two conflicts.

Recent unpleasant events in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, Russian threats against Poland in response to the latter’s acceptance of American missile defense systems, and Russian support of Iran, among many other similar events in the same vein have all but vindicated Kagan’s central thesis; that the end of the cold war did not bring a new, unprecedented, shining peaceful world order. It was, rather, a pause in the never-ending game of politics, conflict, and self-interest that nations play on the world stage.

The relief felt in the west at the implosion of the “Evil Empire” was short-lived; 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall) and 1991 (disillusion of the Soviet Union) now seem like events of the distant past. Kagan argues a strong case that a resurgent Russia with its autocratic, pseudo-democratic, totalitarian-style capitalism will be at the core of a great new international conflict, not necessarily leading to open war, that will pit democracies against autocracies. Flush with oil capital and apparently still smarting from the loss of its former regional supremacy and international super-power status Russia is belligerent and bellicose and not afraid to both rattle its saber and also occasionally pull it from its sheath. Kagan suggests that we are entering a new Cold War-type era but just like the first Cold War we live in dangerous times.

Europe’s response to WWII and the Cold War was a greater reliance of American power and a concomitant diminishment of their own military capabilities. There seemed a heady long moment after 1989 in which the European Union’s foundational concepts of the unity of formerly antagonistic European nations would extent to eastern Europe and enfold the former Soviet Republics on Russia’s western frontier if not Russia herself in its cooperative, supranational embrace. After the Cold War Russia seemed to be lurching towards a kind of democracy that would be understandable, workable, and most importantly, non-expansionist. There was hope in the West and in western Europe that Russia would be brought into the fold of the EU concept where formerly military conflicts would be adjudicated at The Hague and battlefields would run red with capital gains and losses rather than blood. The invasion of Georgia blasts these conceptions to dust.

Now that Russia is openly belligerent, bellicose, and expansionist what response can Europe have? Insufficient in military capabilities to deal with the threat and entirely (and understandably) adverse to conflicts that might involve continental powers, and under severe domestic immigration pressures of their own making, Europe is now almost powerless against an expansionist Russia.

The eradication of national borders, national currencies, and state-based military power has now backfired. Proponents of the EU have created a European multicultural bubble of apparent economic unity, opportunity, and most importantly an absence of warfare between member states but stricken with devastating societal pressures from non-assimilating (and often violent) Muslim immigrants. The price of peace is quite high.

Kagan writes that, “the post-modern, ‘post-national’ spirit of the European Union was Europe’s response to the horrific conflicts of the twentieth century, when nationalism and power politics twice destroyed the continent.” What then can the response be of a block of countries who are understandably averse to war when faced by a nation such as Russia or Iran having no such qualms?

Since WWII, Europe has relied upon the United States for its security while criticizing and castigating it for it’s ‘militarism’. Can there have been the funds to create an EU with its programs and expensive universal benefits if the member states were still required to support significant standing armies for their own defense? As Russia continues to flex its not-inconsiderable economic and military muscles thus challenging the post-Cold War post-modern concepts of European peace, the EU will certainly move closer to the United States.

Kagan writes that, “the great fallacy of our era has been the belief that a liberal international order rests on the triumph of ideas and on the natural unfolding of human progress.”

Kagan’s insight is accurate as there are clearly forces at work in the world that do not have the same concepts of “progress” as those held by western democratic societies. The international stage upon which nation states have always come together and apart in alliances, conflicts and warfare has not been reworked since the fall of the Soviet Union. Kagan is clear on this point and his analysis of the near and far future has a decided ring of truth about it. But it is not the “one ring” - the British understand this as do the French and the Americans. The reawakened “Russian Bear” has announced in no uncertain terms, most clearly in its recent invasion of Georgia and threats against Poland, that it has once again made a quite loud entrance on the world stage and will likely not make a gracious exit any time in the near future. Wealthy, with money and weaponry to spare (and sell), and anxious to reestablish its lost respect and honor, Russia is once again a serious open opponent of the West. Kagan’s analysis of the current and likely near future international situation is impressive but for one no at all minor consideration- the minimization of the very real threat of expansionist Islamism.

The threat of the political Islamist movement is discussed in only six pages of Return of History. The issue is essentially dismissed rather than analyzed in any depth. Kagan describes the goals of the Islamists as a “hopeless dream”. His dismissal of this threat is a serious error in analysis. Even after 9/11, London, Paris, Madrid, Beslan, Bali, Istanbul, constant attacks in Israel, and so many other terror attacks perpetrated by Islamists so few analysts demonstrate a deep understanding of this existential threat. It is a serious mistake to suggest that these events of terror are only the actions of isolated extremists. While the United States focuses its national energies on propping up and defending the EU and facing off against Russia - and perhaps China and other autocracies - we will lose the war here at home precisely as it is being lost in Britain and France through demographic jihad. Democracy vs. autocracy is not necessarily an existential conflict The war declared upon us by Islamists is existential. As assailed as is Israel, the West seems unable to believe it.

Mr. Kagan’s insights into international geopolitics are, in the main, so insightful it is discomforting and bizarre that he should minimize and so mischaracterize the conflict between freedom and Islamist expansionism so completely.

It is a lonely and ultimately desperate fight, however, for in the struggle between traditionalism and modernity, tradition cannot win - even though traditional forces armed with modern weapons, technologies, and ideologies can do horrendous damage.

He is not altogether mistaken, but he has missed the point entirely.

The conflict between the West and expansionist and political Islam is not a conflict between tradition vs. modernity. Islam represents an all-encompassing belief system that, in its totality, is antithetical to the foundations of modern democratic societies such as those in Western Europe and the United States. Islamic states do not reject the benefits of modernity - Riyadh, Dubai, and Kuwait City are certainly illustrative - they embrace them; but they do not share the concepts of modern thought regarding religious tolerance, women’s equality, peaceful coexistence, freedom of speech, and liberal republican forms of government driven by the voice of the citizens through their representatives. The forces of political Islam do not ascribe to modern ideologies as Kagan’s suggest, theirs is an ideology from the 7th century. The age of their philosophy ought not to confuse analysts, they are more than happy to employ modern tools in their jihad against the West.

The vast majority of the people of the Middle East have no desire to go back 1400 years, proclaims Kagan.

This may be so but it cannot be proven, and in it’s delivery is a misleading assertion. There appears to be little of the luddite in the Islamist’s goals, only the dominance of their religious, political, and societal concepts to the exclusion of all others. However, if there is such a “vast majority” as suggested by Kagan who do wish for peace and democracy and freedom of speech and religious tolerance but are silent while an “extremist” minority runs their countries and controls every aspect of their spiritual, political, and intellectual lives, what does it matter what Kagan’s silent, compliant “peace-loving” and progressive “majority” believes?

Kagan suggests that the autocrats of China and Russia are behind the change in political positioning and approach that will likely separate the world into two opposing democratic and autocratic camps. But, he does not discuss the “vast majority” of Russians or Chinese. Why aren’t the “majorities” of China and Russia as salient to Kagan as the “majorities” in the Islamic world, “the vast majority of the people of the Middle East”? And what of these supposed silent “majorities” who, much like those of the Islamic world, would prefer freedom to tyranny and representation in government to dictats from some central committee of autocrats and theocrats?

If the “majority” is in silent conflict with their governments they are of no moment in this ugly calculous of geopolitics for as goes the government, so goes the population until such time as the government abjures totalitarianism and cares for the will of the people, or these governments are overturned and new ones put in their place. If such a population of silent dissent exists in the Muslim world, what options for dissent and reform do they have?

Where was the outcry from moderate peaceful Islam after 9/11, Bali, London, Madrid, etc.? The silence has been deafening. Thousands did however came out in the streets across the world to protest satirical cartoons of Mohammed but less than a pittance spoke out in public about the violence perpetrated by fellow religionists. In some Muslim countries people were seen dancing in the streets as the Twin Towers burned and fell on 9/11.

In societies where questioning the holy books is punishable by death; where non Muslims are not afforded equal rights; where women are less than second-class citizens; where conversion is forbidden and punishable by death; where homosexuals and adulterers are stoned, hung, and beheaded; where children are considered legitimate carriers of explosives and sent on suicide/murder missions; where expansion, conquest, anti-Semitism and a deeply troubling duality of falsehood and truth (the Koranic concept of taqiyya; Koran, 16:106; Ishaq 224; Ishaq 771) how can the “silent majority” who certainly must exist according to Kagan even begin to start a discussion that could lead to reform? Kagan’s calculous falls on the swords of the religion of peace.

The “cartoon controversy” of 2005 is ample illustration of the deep challenges faced by non- Muslim societies in Europe and North America. The worldwide extreme response across the Islamic world against the Danish cartoons is as illustrative as 9/11 and all the other terror attacks that have occurred in the West, Israel, or Iraq. “Islam” means submission. The message of the violent Jihadists and cultural warriors of Islam is that adherents and non-adherents alike must submit to their ideas of society, government, and jurisprudence. After Germany was defeated, there was a de-nazified Germany; after the communist countries fell, there were post-communist societies. Where Islamism and sharia have prevailed, there have rarely been post-Islamic societies. Once a society is Islamized it rarely takes a different path or returns to a previous political or social system. This is certainly an existential struggle. 9/11 and the “cartoon” reaction are two sides of one coin - global jihad. Muslims are specifically commanded by Koran to participate in jihad, not doing so is apostasy. Muslims are not allowed to question the Koran or Islamic law. A fundamental purpose of global jihad is to make non-Muslims obey the laws of Islam or face the consequences.

And what of Kagan and his autocracies vs. democracies world view? Kagan negates this greatest of struggles and minimizes what is at stake - nothing less than national and cultural survival. The West is faced with violent jihad and long-term-horizon cultural jihad through non-assimilation and demographic conquest - the very challenges faced by France and Britain today. Expansionist political Islam and its supporters strike terror on the one hand and gain legitimacy on the other while the West sleeps and is preoccupied with autocrats in Beijing, Tehran, and Moscow. The uses of multiculturalism are myriad most notably to those forces whose goal is the destruction of those societies having multiculturalism at their core.

Winston Churchill spoke against appeasement prior to WWII. Churchill said of Islamism that

no stronger retrograde force exists in the world. Far from being moribund, Mohammedism is a militant and proselytizing faith.

In our politically correct world of carbon footprint obsessions, multiculturalism, empty chants of “change”, in our world of hot wars, an apparent new Cold War, and this ongoing jihad against us, it is astounding that the people of Europe and the United States who embrace inclusiveness and tolerance, will not speak out and give a name to the forces of intolerance, exclusion and violence among us.

One would have thought on 9/10 that the events of 9/11 and beyond would suffice to hearken the populations of the West to this grave existential threat. Following attacks in London, Paris, Bali, and Madrid, there continues to be appeasement for political Islam and sharia but a hardline against Russian hegemony in Georgia. The clear hegemonic behavior of aggressor states is much easier for the western mind to comprehend than terrorism and demographic conquest. We fail to learn the dangers at our peril.

This confusion of conflicts pulls us in several directions - now, thanks to Return to History and End of Dreams we are told that the critical threat is but a “hopeless dream” of the jihadists and that we ought to give our attentions more to the democracy-aristocracy conflict.

There is a glaring fault line in Kagan’s minimization of political Islam and its growing internal and external threat to the United States. The experience of England and France in particular is illustrative of the dangers of demographic jihad against the West. After decades of almost unfettered immigration - in large part from Muslim countries - Britain and France now have the painful challenge of integrating millions of immigrants who are opposed to the culture and political system of their host countries and demonstrate little interest in assimilation. Inspired by hate speech from mosque pulpits, the Islamic minorities of Europe support by their silence and deeds the extremist agenda of their jihadist coreligionists. The United States now faces the same problems, but not on such an extreme level, yet, as that faced by many European nations. Lack of immigration controls and multiculturalist ideas that limit a society’s ability to defend itself against non-assimilating cultures are at the root of this problem.

“One of the problems with making the struggle against Islamic terrorism the sole focus of American foreign policy,” Kagan writes, “is that it produces illusions about alliance and cooperation with other great powers with whom genuine alliance is becoming impossible.”

Alliances based on mutual aid against common threats (the enemy of my enemy is my friend) is as common an approach to statecraft for as long as there have been nation states and long before. Such alliances are not “illusion” in the past they have often been necessities (the Russo-German pact then the Soviet/Allied pact come to mind). In the midst of conflicts some take more precedence than others, and these ought to be the foundations for new and unexpected alliances in the future. For Kagan to suggest that nontraditional alliances between states in conflict is illusory is an error of analysis and suggestion. Could one have foreseen a U.S.- Soviet alliance after the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1940? And, even more importantly, the Lend-Lease program kept the Soviets fighting on the Eastern front when, without it, they may have fallen to Nazi conquest. Mutual challenges and mutual enemies make strange bedfellows. It has always been so. Such alliances of mutual need and temporary convenience and necessity should not be dismissed so cavalierly. And upon such temporary agreements, new more permanent relationships can be born.

After 9/11 and numerous terror attacks across Europe, the Far and Middle East since with Islamist goals of dominance at their core, expansionist Islam is the fundamental challenge facing every non-Islamic state in the world - autocracies included. Mutual challenges can bridge the gap between antagonists otherwise engaged with each other. The challenges of today that pit absolutism and intolerance against democracies can be, and ought to be, the unifying issue that unites otherwise antagonistic nations. Global Islamist terrorism is a clear signal to the United States, China, Russia, and even those secular Arab states that are seen by the Islamists as insufficiently orthodox. The fight against Islamist terror and the political and religious zealots who use such cruel tactics is, essentially, part of a global conflict and world war already underway.

In the last world war unexpected alliances were made brought about by the recognition of mutual threats and common interests. The profound lack of respect that Islamism has for the cultures of the west and our lives is not difficult to understand. The innocent dead of 9/11, Beslan and London, Madrid, Bali, Paris, etc., are the binding forces of a new international contract of cooperation - or, at least, ought to be.

Islamism is the common threat faced by China, Russia, and the United States. Recent Islamist violence in China during the Olympics is evidence that even highly controlled societies like China’s are not immune to the threat of global jihad. No country, and no political system is immune.

Kagan has missed the point. The United States, its allies and rivals are all under threat of terror and worse by the jihadists of a global expansionist, violent, political philosophy. If Mr. Kagan does indeed have the ear of the next president, I hope that he will say to him, “Let us form surprising new alliances. Let us acknowledge this mutual existential threat and fight it together with our friends and rivals. Let us be the guide for our former rivals - now friends - to the City on the Hill and hope and pray that they follow.”