Just read your article. First off, let me say that it is much better than the usual anti-Hood stuff these types of magazines usually publish. It was nice to see a fresh review of the battle. Also interesting is your take on the episode with friction primers and the 1st Kentucky Battery. However, I do not think it was a turning point. Even before some of Opdycke’s men hit that area in their rush forward, the 12th Kentucky, 16th Kentucky, and 175th Ohio had plowed into the Rebels troops who had penetrated the main line east of Columbia Pike. In all honesty, Opdycke troops (the 44th Illinois and 74th/88th Illinois) had little to do with retaking those guns. If anybody deserves the credit it was the two Kentucky regiments which did the heavy lifting, helped immensely by the recruits of the 175th Ohio. Moreover, if the Rebels had the Kentucky battery in their possesion for three or four minutes they were lucky. Even with friction primers they could only fire so many times and they had about 1,500 men bearing down on them, not including elements of Wagner’s two brigades which had rallied and main line troops who had also rallied. Frankly, they could have pockets filled with primers and it wasn’t going to matter. Once the Confederates broke into the interior of the Federal perimeter they were doomed.

Still, the article was VERY good and those who read it and know little about Franklin will get a much more balanced perspective.

Eric

The Harpeth River was so high and swift that the retreating Federals couldn’t ford it. (The bridge at Franklin had washed away.) The impassablly high river was the sole reason the Federals were even in Franklin!

Forrest and his requested division of infantry would have had to precariously forded the river 3-4 miles South of Franklin (records reveal that a Mississippi cavalry man named Dennis or Dennys AND his horse drowned while attempting to ford the river earlier), march to Hollow Tree Gap 12-15 miles in a circuitous route east and north to avoid the Union guns at Ft Granger, fighting Union Gen Wilson’s cavalry the entire way, and contend with a Union infantry division which had been placed in reserve north of the Harpeth…and accomplish all of this in three hours time before darkness!

Hood is commonly charged (although not by Daniel) as being incoherently angered at Franklin, ordering the charge in a fit of vengeful rage. This is supported only by evidence that Hood was described as angry several hours previously in the early morning hours of Nov. 30. (No eyewitnesses describe him as enraged at any other time of the day…to the contrary, witnesses record Hood’s demeanor as composed and quite normal during the day of Nov. 30.)

Why aren’t the same accusations directed at Forrest? If throwing a fit at sunrise on Nov. 30 means that you are unable to reason for the entire day, why is Forrest’s (quite impracticable) proposal to flank not tagged as being clouded by anger? Here is a quote from Pvt. John Copley of the 49th Tennessee describing the outrage of Nathan Bedford Forrest on Nov 30 in his 1893 book, “A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin, with Reminiscences of Camp Douglass.” Copley wrote: “When we discovered their successful escape on the morning of the 30th, our chagrin and disappointment can be better imagined than described. General Forrest was so enraged that his face turned almost to a chalky whiteness, and his lips quivered. He cursed out some of the commanding officers, and censured them for allowing the Federal army to escape. I looked at him, as he sat in his saddle pouring forth his volumes of wrath, and was almost thunderstruck to listen to him, and to see no one dare resent it.”

Could anger have clouded Forrest’s reasoning when he implored Hood to allow him to take a division of infantry (2,000 men), ford a swollen river and march 12-15 miles in 3 hours, fighting Union infantry and cavalry the entire way?